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I. INTRODUCTION
Myanmar is the only Asian country that comes up in almost
every list of countries recruiting child soldiers globally.1 Since the
country’s independence in 1948, it has been politically unstable and
has engaged in civil conflict. As a result, the Myanmar National Army
(Tatmadaw) and almost all of the Burmese ethnic groups have
systematically recruited child soldiers.2 Besides the government
forces, ethnic militias like the Karen National Liberation Army, the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Army (SSA), and
the Ta’ang National Liberation Army in the Burmese states of
Kachin, Kayin, and Shan are major recruiters of child soldiers.3
In 2002, Human Rights Watch released a report, My Gun was
as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma, that put forth some shocking
statistics, calling Myanmar the largest country in the world that
recruited child soldiers.4 According to the report, Myanmar had
70,000 child soldiers under the age of 18.5 Those 70,000 child soldiers
make up 20% of the total active-duty soldiers in the country.6 Among
the ethnic-based militias, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) is the
biggest recruiter with approximately 2,000 soldiers under 18 and 600800 of them under 15.7 The Kachin Independence Army is the only

1
Jared Ferrie, Five countries where child soldiers are still recruited, IRIN NEWS
(May 17, 2016), http://www.irinnews.org/news/2016/05/17/five-countrieswhere-child-soldiers-are-still-recruited; Meghan Werft, 7 countries using child
soldiers, GLOBAL CITIZEN (February 12, 2016), https://www.globalcitizen.
org/en/content/7-countries-that-still-use-child-soldiers/.
2
IMAGE ASIA, NO CHILDHOOD AT ALL A REPORT ABOUT CHILD
SOLDIERS IN BURMA [8] (Thailand Images Asia 1997).
3
U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc.
A/70/836-S/2016/360 (Apr. 20, 016).
4
Pau Khan Kau Hangzo, Resolving Internal Conflict in Myanmar: A Human
Security Approach, CENTRE FOR NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (May 2009),
http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/nts/resources/nts-insight/NTS%20Insight%20May
%202009.1.pdf.
5
Kevin Heppner, My Gun was Tall as me: Child Soldiers in Burma 106, 226,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2002), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/burma
/Burma0902.pdf.
6
Hangzo, supra note 4, at 3.
7
Heppner, supra note 5, at 7.
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group that recruits girl soldiers under 18, mostly forcefully.8 Both the
government and ethnic militias have policies against recruiting
children yet they continue to recruit using special procedures.9 There
is a gap between their commitments and actual practices.
Despite understanding the causes, effects, and rationality
behind the use of child soldiers, the situation in Myanmar has
remained unchanged. This comment argues that, in order to end
child-soldiering, the government must solve the socio-economic and
political issues of the country, which are the causes behind it. Political
measures include bringing the regions, governed by differing ethnic
groups, under the purview of the central government, so that the
child soldiers in their armies can be rescued. Second, bringing the
military under the government command, to ensure that malpractices
by the military leaders do not go unpunished.
This comment begins with a brief introduction of the issue of
child soldiers in Myanmar. Section two of the comment is a
discussion of the political actors in the country and the definitions of
a child soldier. Different governments and treaties have used
different definitions and this comment provides an overview of these
definitions. This section also explores the development of Myanmar’s
society. It delves into how civil conflict and political instability have
been a major cause of child soldiering. Section three begins with a
discussion on what can be done to solve the issue of political
instability. This is followed by an analysis of the unrestrained power
of the Burmese military and its connection to the proliferation of
child soldiering. Again, the section identifies the options available to
the new government to bring its military under civilian control.
Section four deals with the development of the international law
applicable to child soldering and why it has proved to be unsuccessful
in the case of Myanmar has been examined. It will explore the
limitations of international law on the prohibition of underage
recruitment, and the subsequent criminal charges against those
military officials involved in that recruitment.
Id.
Burma: World’s Highest Number of Child Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Oct. 16, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/10/16/burma-worlds-highestnumber-child-soldiers.
8
9
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. Major Political Actors
The national military came to power after the coup of 1962.
It replaced the civilian government and imposed martial law10 that
was in effect till 1974.11 This period saw significant expansion in the
role of military in the national economy, politics, and state
bureaucracy. In 1988, another coup brought the military back to
power which formed a government called the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC).12 SLORC remained in power till 2011
when it was dissolved.13 The military became a very powerful
institution in the country after being in power for almost 50 years
since independence.14 In 2011, it transferred the power to the Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
The USDP was formed in 2010 and was primarily used as a
political platform for many of the country’s former military leaders. It
was headed by former president, Thein Sein and won more than 75%
of the votes in the 2010 elections, which were largely considered to
be flawed.15 The party only won 8% of the votes in the 2015 elections
Martial law is defined as military control over all of a country’s activities,
usually during wartime or due to an emergency or widespread disaster.
11
In 1974, the military transferred the power to an elected government,
formed by a single party – the Burma Socialist Programme Party. This was a hybrid
government between the military and the civilians. See generally, Konsam Shakila
Devi, Myanmar under the Military Rule 1962-1988, INT’L RES. J. OF SOC. SCI. (Oct.
2014), http://www.isca.in/IJSS/Archive/v3/i10/8.ISCA-IRJSS-2014-173.pdf.
12
Nehginpao Kipgen, Burma’s 8888: A Movement That Lives on, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nehginpao-kipgen/burmas8888_b_3723013.html (last visited Oct.3, 2016).
13
Associated Press in Naypyitaw, Burma junta disbanded as ‘civilian’ government
sworn in, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2011/mar/30/burma-civilian-governmnet-junta-disbanded.
14
During its rule, the military has done more bad than good for the
country. Scott Mathieson, Burma’s Military Milestone, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar.
30, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/30/burmas-military-milestone.
15
The United States and the European Union criticized the military leaders
and dismissed the elections for not being free or fair. According to these western
powers, the elections did not meet the internationally accepted standards. The
voters complained that they were not allowed to vote in private and many state
10
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and is said to be undergoing major changes before the 2020
elections.16
The National League for Democracy (NLD) was formed in
1988 under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. The Party won 59%
of the votes in the 1990 elections but the military regime did not
allow the Party to form the government, repressed it instead, and
placed Suu Kyi under house arrest. Further, the Party boycotted the
2010 elections because some of its prominent leaders were not
allowed to contest the elections. NLD re-registered and ran for the
2015 elections, which it won by a landslide victory.
The six major ethnic groups in Myanmar are the Arakanese,
Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, and Mon. Each of these groups
have their share of grievances against Tatmadaw. In addition, these
groups also have their own states and armed groups.17 These groups
have been fighting the military government since 1962 for not
implementing the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which guaranteed
the groups: regional autonomy under a federal governing structure,
employees had been forced to vote for the military in advance. Similarly, the United
Nations claimed that the citizens do not have the freedom of expression or
associations. It doubted the legitimacy of these elections. Trevor Wilson, The
Significance of Myanmar’s 2010 elections, NEW MANDALA (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.newmandala.org/the-significance-of-myanmar%E2%80%99s-2010election/.
16
Ei EI Toe Lwin, USDP looks to rebound from 2015 election drubbing, THE
MYANMAR TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/nationalnews/nay-pyi-taw/22075-usdp-looks-to-rebound-from-2015-electiondrubbing.html.
17
Arakan (aka Rahkine) State: Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) and the
Arakan Army (AA). Chin State: Chin National Army (CNA). Kachin State: Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) Shan State: Kachin Independence Army (KIA), United
Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA Mongla),
Shan State Army - South (SSA - S), Shan State Army - North (SSA - N), Wa
National Army (WNA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA),
Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), and the
Pa’O Peoples Liberation Army (PPLA). Karenni (aka Kayah) State: Karenni Army
(KnA) and the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP). Karen (aka Kayin) State: Karen
National
Defense
Organization/Karen
National
Liberation
Army
(KNDO/KNLA) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). Mon
State: Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA).
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right to self-determination, religious freedom, and ethnic minority
rights.18
Tatmadaw, the two major political parties (USDP and NLD)
and the armed ethnic groups are the major political players in the
politics of Myanmar. They have dominated the political scene for
decades and the continuous quandary between them has been the
origin of internal conflict in the country.
B. Definitions
The Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict 200719 defines a child soldier as “any person below
18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited
to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or
for sexual purposes.”20
Definitions by scholars differ based on whether they consider
child soldiering to be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary child
soldiering is defined when “children, particularly those orphaned or
disconnected from civil society, may volunteer to join any group if
they believe that this is the only way to guarantee regular meals,
clothing or medical attention.”21 However, Ingunn Bjorkhaug, a
researcher with the Fafo Foundation, argues that child soldiering is
never voluntary in a real sense i.e. it is “voluntarily forced” as

Panglong Agreement of 1947, UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKER (Feb. 12,
1947), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MM_470212_Pan
glon%20Agreement.pdf.
19
The Paris Principles were adopted in Paris in February 2007
demonstrate the strengthened international resolve to prevent the recruitment and
abuse of children. It also highlights the actions governments should take to protect
the children affected by conflict. The Paris Principles are the operational guidelines
regarding the sustainable reintegration of children formerly associated with the
armed groups.
20
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles, (Feb. 2007),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/465198442.html.
21
PETER W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 62 (Pantheon Books, 1st ed.
2005).
18
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children may not have any other option but to join armed groups.22
In the case of Myanmar, both voluntary23 and involuntary24 soldiering
is evident. However, regardless of the way the children are recruited,
they are abused and become victims of violence. A few scholars
argue that the child soldiers sometimes kill or torture members of
their own community. In doing so, they can even become
perpetrators themselves.25
C. Development of Myanmar’s Society
Over the years, researchers have established that the primary
causes of the increase in recruitment and use of child soldiers can be
attributed to the following factors: the presence of civil conflict/war,
political instability, and strong indoctrination by army and insurgent
groups.26 In the case of Myanmar, the two major causes of child
soldiering are ongoing ethnic conflicts and political instability.27
These factors create an environment in which businesses and schools
cannot function causing other factors such as poverty, illiteracy,
unemployment, ideological influences, and culture to be the
secondary causes of child soldiering.
The ethnic-based groups have been at loggerheads with each
other and the government since independence in 1948. The civil
22
KAI CHEN, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHILD SOLDIERING ON
MYANMAR-CHINA BORDER 18 (Springer 2014).
23
Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers 16, 136, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Oct. 31, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/burma1007/burma1007webw
cover.pdf.
24
Id. at 7.
25
Vaha argues in her paper Victims or Perpetrators: Child Soldiers and the
vacuum of responsibility that child soldiers between the ages of 15 to 18 years are moral
agents with specific responsibilities for their roles as soldiers and so they should be
considered morally responsible combatants as well. The child soldier with an armed
group is not only a ‘child’ but also a ‘soldier’ with combatant duties. This fact
should not be ignored when dealing with child soldiers. See generally Milla Vaha,
Victims or Perpetrators: Child Soldiers and the vacuum of responsibility, ISA’s 50th
ANNUAL CONVENTION, New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY,
2014, 11-30 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p312482_index.html.
26
See generally RACHEL BRETT & IRMA SPECHT, YOUNG SOLDIERS: WHY
THEY CHOOSE TO FIGHT (Lynne Rienner 2004).
27
CHEN, supra note 22, at 19.
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conflict between the government and at least one of the 15 different
ethnic groups has been ensuing for 60 years, making it the world’s
longest running civil war.28 Some ethnic groups, like the UWSA,
signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1989, were
given autonomy in their region, and allowed to maintain their armed
forces.29 However, other groups like the KIA are still fighting for
autonomy under a democratic federal union.30
The central government has no control over the political,
military, and economic activities undertaken by the ethnic groups in
their autonomous regions, especially in the case of UWSA.31 This has
also affected the quality of education and employment opportunities
for the children in these regions. They have no option but to go to
schools operated by the ethnic militias. Although the ethnic groups
like KIA and UWSA fund and operate schools in their regions, the
education is highly biased and propagandized. For instance, ethnic
nationalism is entrenched in the KIA funded education system.32
Moreover, these schools also include pre-military training in their
curriculum.33
According to the interview conducted by Child Soldiers
International, most of the children have voluntarily joined the KIAfunded schools and want to work as KIA civil servants. However,
there are still many children who would rather join KIA’s
28
Ivan Watson, Javed Iqbal, & Manny Maung, Myanmar’s hidden war, CNN
(Nov. 11, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/11/asia/myanmar-shanrebels-civil-war/.
29
David Brunnstrom, Myanmar Ethnic Leaders Reject Drug Accusations,
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 1999), http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives
/199904/msg00420.html; Aung Naing Oo, Wa Ceasefire Haunts the Burmese Military,
THE NATION (Apr. 30, 1999), http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives
/199904/msg00448.html.
30
Nehginpao Kipgen, Address Kachin Problem Politically, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nehginpao-kipgen/kachinburma-conflict_b_2480290.html.
31
Yun Sun, The UWSA and the Peace Process, STIMSON CENTER (Aug. 10,
2016), https://www.stimson.org/content/uwsa-and-peace-process.
32
Child Soldiers International, A Dangerous Refuge: Ongoing child recruitment by
the Kachin Independence Army 14, 38, (2015), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid
/55a4e7194.pdf.
33
CHEN, supra note 22, at 24; Id.
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revolutionary movement. This originates from the teachings, by KIA,
regarding historical grievances and injustice committed by the
Burmese government forces.34 These grievances have developed
from events such as the failure of the Panglong Agreement of 1947,35
forced to transform KIA’s armed groups into Border Guard Force
under control of Tatmadaw, hostile actions by the government
towards KIA in 2010 followed by major assault in 2011 and
perpetration of widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity
against the Kachin civilian population.36 Children are taught how the
government has committed injustice towards their people and why it
is necessary to take arms.37 Thus, the indoctrination process the
children undergo in their schools and society must be stopped for
child soldiering to come to an end. However, in order to do this, the
central government will have to devise new power-sharing
agreements wherein they can supervise the socio-economic systems
in the insurgent-controlled areas. Through these systems the
government can ensure that the children receive primary education
and that the working age population has employment opportunities.
If the problems of illiteracy and unemployment are solved in this
manner then less children will join KIA.
Wessells, based on his extensive work on impacts of war on
children, argues that societal systems that provide food, water,
Child Soldiers International, supra note 32, at 15.
The Panglong Agreement of 1947, was reached at Panglong in the Shan
states in Burma between the Shan, Kachin and Chin ethnic minority leaders and
Aung San, head of the interim Burmese government. The agreement accepted “Full
Autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas” in principle and
envisioned the creation of Kachin State by the Constituent Assembly. However,
the government failed to fulfill its promise of equitable distribution of resources
between Myanmar’s dominant Bamar group and the ethnically marginalized
communities which has been the root cause of the long, violent civil conflict in the
country.
36
Human Rights violations by the Burmese Army includes attacks against
civilian populations, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and
detention, land confiscations, recruitment of child soldiers and forced labor and
portending. This has caused large scale internal displacement with entire villages
forced to displace. See Burma’s Covered up War: Atrocities Against the Kachin People,
OXFORD BURMA ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/uploads/9/1
/8/4/9184764/kwat-report-book-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) at 8.
37
Child Soldiers International, supra note 32, at 12.
34
35
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education, and healthcare to children are largely affected by war. As a
consequence, children consider armed groups to be their only way to
access these basic necessities.38 This is the case with the Burmese
children who live with armed groups for food, shelter and
protection.39 Similarly, there were cases of child soldiers joining the
Tatmadaw only because it provided them two meals a day.40
The rise of the military regime in the 1960s and its
consolidation of power after the 1988 protests was the beginning of
widespread poverty and malnourishment in Myanmar.41 In 1990, the
United States (U.S.) and the European Union (E.U.) imposed
sanctions against Myanmar after the military regime refused to
transfer the power to the democratic government that won the
elections.42 The political effectiveness of these sanctions is still
debated and there is no evidence that it was the sanction that led to
Aung San Suu Kyi’s victory last year.43 The negative impact of the
sanctions, on the other hand, can clearly be seen from its abysmal
performance on the Human Development Index.44 Take for instance,
the garment industry which relied on the exports to the U.S. When
the industry was closed after the sanctions, almost 60,000 jobs were

MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO
PROTECTION 44 (Harvard University Press 2006).
39
Child Soldiers International, Chance for Change: Ending the recruitment and
use of child soldiers in Myanmar 31, (Jan. 2013), http://www.burmalibrary.org
/docs14/CSI-myanmar_chance_for_change.pdf.
40
Heppner, supra note 5, at 183.
41
Alison Vicary & Sean Turnell, Sanction on Burma have a role to play, THE
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (AU) (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au
/federal-politics/political-opinion/sanctions-on-burma-have-a-role-to-play20091005-gjaz.html.
42
European Commission, The EU’s relations with Burma/Myanmar 2, --,
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents
/fd/dase20050419_003/dase20050419_003en.pdf.; Byron Tau & Carol Lee, U.S. to
End Economic Sanctions against Myanmar, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-end-economic-sanctions-against-myanmar-1473874082.
43
Hillary Benn, Look at the sanctions on Burma, NETWORK MYANMAR (Feb.
25, 2016), http://www.networkmyanmar.org/sanctions.
44
Paul Vrieze, UN Ranks Burma among 3 Least Developed Asian Nations, THE
IRRAWADDY (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/un-ranks-burmaamong-3-least-developed-asian-nations.html.
38
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lost and poverty and associated social problems increased.45
Furthermore, as unemployment increased, household income for the
majority of the workers declined, and families struggled to meet their
nutritional needs. It is estimated that 44% of children in Myanmar
suffered from malnourishment nationwide.46
At present, 25.6% of the Burmese population lives below the
national poverty line, which is the highest among all the Southeast
Asian countries.47 Although Myanmar’s growth rate has been about
7% and Foreign Direct Investment (F.D.I.) is expected to increase to
$100 billion in the next two decades, none of this development is
reaching the ordinary citizens, especially those living the rural areas.48
Poverty is largely concentrated in the rural regions of the
country.49 The main causes of rural poverty include lack of assets
(land)50 and unorganized labor.51 Revenues from the sale of the
natural resources are not directed towards rural development but
instead fill the pockets of the military leaders and their crony
companies.52 This can be seen in the case of water, gemstones, oil
and gas, and timber. Moreover, due to lack of agricultural land,
income generation options are very limited. In addition, government
schools in rural areas are mostly closed, leaving the rural children
Gabriel Andreasson, Evaluating the effects of economic sanctions against Burma,
LUO STUDENT PAPERS 3, (2008), https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/
publication/1335119.
46
TED RALL, WAKE UP, YOU’RE LIBERAL!: HOW WE CAN TAKE AMERICA
BACK FROM THE RIGHT 289 (Soft Skull Press 2004).
47
Poverty in Myanmar Basic 2016 Statistics, ASIAN DEV. BANK (Apr. 2016),
https://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/poverty#tabs-0-2.
48
David Steinberg, Reexamining Growth and Poverty in Myanmar, ASIA
FOUND. (June 25, 2014), http://asiafoundation.org/2014/06/25/reexamininggrowth-and-poverty-in-myanmar/.
49
Nikolas Win Myint, Growing together: Reducing Rural Poverty in Myanmar,
THE WORLD BANK (May 9, 2016), http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/
growing-together-reducing-rural-poverty-in-myanmar.
50
Anu Seth, Myanmar – The Rural-Urban Divide, MYANMAR INSIDER (Sept.,
2014), http://www.myanmarinsider.com/myanmar-the-rural-urban-divide/.
51
Christina Cho, Poverty in Myanmar, THE BORGEN PROJECT (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://borgenproject.org/poverty-myanmar/.
52
Global Witness, Jade: Myanmar’s “Big State Secret”, (Oct. 2015),
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/myanmarjade/.
45

381

2018

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

6:1

without education.53 These children are then forced by the soldiers,
or lured by the salary, to join the national army.54
III. ANALYSIS
A. Political Stability
Needless to say, the new government needs to develop
poverty reduction strategies. One way of doing this is by regulating
the sale of the natural resources. Revenue generated from the sale of
the resources should be used for the development of the rural
population. For instance, 90% of the hydroelectricity generated from
the Myitsone dam was to be transferred to China while 84% of
Burmese rural population would have lived in dark.55 The
government must reconsider such deals. The partnership between the
military leaders, Chinese businesses, and ethnic leaders must be
broken or they should be required to pay a certain percentage of their
revenues towards local development.
One step in the direction of political stability is to bring all
the stakeholders – the government, military, and ethnic groups –
together with the aim of stopping all forms of skirmishes between
them. In 2015, eight out of the fifteen ethnic groups signed the
National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the Government of
Myanmar.56 This was achieved after two years of negotiations.57 The
NCA is a peace-building agreement dealing with ceasefires, their
implementation, monitoring, and political dialogues between the

Heppner, supra note 5, at 24.
Id. at 37.
55
Rachel Harvey, Burma dam: Why Myitsone plan is being halted, BBC (Sept.
30, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15123833; Yu Jincui,
Chinese firms seek to restart suspended projects after Myanmar’s transition, GLOBAL TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://www. globaltimes.cn/content/979575.shtml.
56
Trevor Wilson, Is Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement good enough?,
EAST ASIA FORUM (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/21/ismyanmars-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-good-enough/.
57
Myanmar signs peace deal with armed groups, BBC (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34536002.
53
54
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government and the ethnic groups.58 But the legitimacy of the NCA
is being questioned after realizing that the most powerful ethnic
groups - UWSA, SSA and KIA - did not sign it.59
Myanmar-expert, Bertil Lintner, called the entire peace
process by the government of President Thein Sein flawed because it
created more problems than it has solved.60 He argues that the
conflict has intensified during President Sein’s government against
KIA, SSA, and MNDAA in Kokang. In contrast, Jack Myint,
Myanmar political and business analyst, believes that “NCA is a step
in the right direction” because now peace exists in at least some parts
of the country.61
For now, signing the NCA can wait. Instead, the military
should stop its offensives against KIA and SSA along with its efforts
to take back its territories. It should focus on building peace and trust
with these ethnic groups which is critical for any political dialogue to
take place. These groups have been fighting for their autonomy for
almost five decades and took up arms because the government did
not fulfill their promise to grant them autonomy.62 The distrust is
deep-rooted and therefore the government needs to accept that these
groups will neither surrender their arms nor their autonomy at this
point. Therefore, the government should propose that the ethnic
groups be given autonomy only if they agree to immediately release
all the child soldiers and permit international bodies to conduct
58
Inst. for Security & Dev. Policy, Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(Oct. 2015), http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-isdp-background
er-myanmar-nca.pdf.
59
Oliver Holmes, Myanmar agrees limited ceasefire without most powerful rebel
armies, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2015/oct/15/myanmar-sign-ceasefire-agreement-eight-armed-groups.
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annual audits to check that these armies no longer recruit child
soldiers. Considering that autonomy is so crucial for these groups,
this could influence and persuade them to end the use of child
soldiers. Alternatively, with the issue of autonomy on the table, these
groups will at least participate in the negotiations.
The next step would be to establish some mechanism
wherein the groups can manage their territories but permit the
government to overlook certain matters related to social and
economic development of its people. This would include the
regulation of school curriculums in their regions, implementing
poverty and unemployment reduction policies, monitoring the
discharge process of child soldiers and their reintegration in the
civilian society. However, as recommended by the Human Rights
Watch, it needs to be ensured that this education is non-military in
nature and unrelated to military service.63
The ethnic groups will not likely accept these changes unless
the government offers something in return. The government should
offer assurance that all ethnic groups will have freedom to practice
their religion such as: Islam in Arakan state, and Christianity in Chin
and Kachin states. Likewise, their schools will be permitted to teach
ethnic languages, which was earlier restricted by the military.64
Although these may seem like small steps to the world at large, the
main goal of these ethnic groups is the preservation of their cultures,
traditions, and languages.65 It is why they have demanded autonomy
and taken up arms.66 Therefore, the government must be willing to
reach a compromise with the ethnic groups.
B. Military under Civilian Control
After 1988, the Burmese Army pursued a program of rapid
expansion to maintain a stronger hold over the country, with the aim
Human Rights Watch, supra note 23, at 16.
Fink, supra note 62.
65
Mae Sot, Myanmar’s ethnic problems, IRIN NEWS (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/95195/briefing-myanmar%E2%80%99s-ethnicproblems.
66
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of recruiting 7,000 soldiers per month. This was the time when the
army began forcefully conscripting children in large numbers to meet
their recruitment quota.67 In 2004, the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) established the Committee for Prevention of
Military Recruitment of Underage Children.68 Since then, the
committee has only focused on proving the claims of child
recruitment false.69
The culture of impunity is evident in the military for all types
of human rights violations.70 The complaint mechanisms are said to
be limited and the military is unwilling to discuss it.71 The military has
also created a fear among the people by harassing them. As a result,
people prefer not to report their children’s forced conscription. In
2015, it was reported that 277 servicemen, including 50 officers, were
punished for recruiting child soldiers.72 But there is no further details

Human Rights Watch, supra note 23, at 33-4.
The Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage
Children is the primary initiative by the Burmese government to prevent
conscription of child soldiers. The Committee’s Plan of Action aims to explore five
areas: the demobilization of child soldiers, the reintegration of former child
soldiers, raising public awareness, punishment of persons who violate recruitment
laws and procedures and cooperation with international agencies. However,
Human Rights Watch claims that the Committee has made little progress in
achieving these objectives and keeping military’s recruitment under a check. Id. at
71-72.
69
Id. at 6.
70
The Burmese government has been accused of constantly neglecting
human rights abuses committed by the Burmese military. The government has
maintained its response of not taking responsibility for any injuries. Moreover, the
military regime did not permit the aid groups within its country to provide relief to
the internally displaced people. The international aid organizations have also failed
to provide any assistance. All this only worsened the humanitarian crisis in
Myanmar. See Burma’s Covered up War: Atrocities Against the Kachin People, supra note
36.
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International Center for Transitional Justice, Impunity Prolonged: Burma and
its 2008 Constitution 27, 40, (2009), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJMyanmar-Impunity-Constitution-2009-English.pdf.
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regarding “what” punishment they received or if there are more such
officers awaiting trial.73
The military has emerged as and continues to be the most
powerful organization in Myanmar’s political arena.74 In 2015, Aung
San Suu Kyi and her party won a landslide victory. It is the first
democratic government the country has seen in the last five
decades.75 However, important departments like Home Affairs,
Defense, and Border Affairs are still under the control of the military.
The 2008 constitution adds to the military’s illegitimate power by
allowing the military certain freedoms like to waive habeas corpus for
people it considers to be a threat to their national security or to use
forced labor.76
The military has ensured that it does not completely lose its
power to the new civilian government.77 It is too strong for the
government to make any decisions regarding its functioning. The
government, as a result, has no means to keep checks-and-balances
regarding recruitment of child soldiers. Efforts thus, need to be made
Nick Baker, Tatmadaw discharges 68 former child soldiers, THE MYANMAR
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news
/22445-tatmadaw-discharges-68-former-child-soldiers.html; US: Return Burma, Iraq
to child soldier list, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2017), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2017/06/26/us-return-burma-iraq-child-soldier-list.
74
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Implications for India, VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION 3, 26, (Dec.
2013), http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/the-role-of-myanmar-s-militaryin-democratic-transition-and-implications-for-india.pdf.
75
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http://www.cbsnews.com/news/myanmar-burma-htin-kyaw-first-president-newdemocracy/.
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Jon Emont, Can Myanmar’s new government control its military?, THE NEW
YORKER (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/canmyanmars-new-government-control-its-military.
77
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military also has heavy investments in various projects around the country, which
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to reduce the powers of the military along with bringing it under the
control of the democratic civilian government.
In order to bring Tatmadaw under the new government
command, the 2008 military-created constitution will have to be
amended. This is almost impossible because 25% of the seats are
reserved for the military and more than 75% of votes in parliament
are needed for passing an amendment.78 But, Aung San Suu Kyi has
vowed to amend the constitution to make it more democratic.79
According to U Ko Ni, a prominent human rights lawyer in
Myanmar and NLD party’s longtime adviser, who was shot recently,
Suu Kyi can hold a national referendum to show the military that
people of the country want a new constitution.80 Amendment to the
constitution is therefore, of utmost importance if Suu Kyi hopes to
see a change in the attitude of the military and ultimately, the end of
the culture of impunity prevalent therein.
C. International Law for Child Soldiers
International law dealing with child soldiers has developed
over the last several decades. Two Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Convention of 1949 were adopted in 1977 which dealt with
the application of international humanitarian law to the civilians
caught up in internal conflict.81 In 1989, the Convention on the
Rights of Children (CRC) was adopted, which guarantees the rights
of children during peacetime, as well as in the situation of armed
conflict.82 It came into force in September 1990 and has been ratified
Jon, supra note 76.
Myanmar’s Suu Kyi vows to amend junta-era constitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Apr. 18, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/b0e5742a27e44009bc4b22be5f5bc
112/myanmars-suu-kyi-vows-amend-junta-era-constitution.
80
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by 196 countries.83 In May 2000, two Optional Protocols to the CRC
were adopted by the UN.84 The First Protocol prohibited the
involvement of children under the age of 15 in military conflicts85 and
the Second Protocol disallowed child trafficking, pornography, and
prostitution.86
The Rome Statute, adopted in 1998, made the practice of
conscripting, enlisting, or using children under age of fifteen in
hostilities a war crime.87 This applies to both government-controlled
armed forces and non-state armed forces. It is also the treaty that
established the International Criminal Court (ICC).88 At present,
there are 139 signatories and 124 ratifications to the statue. However,
Myanmar has not acceded to it.89 This was followed by the
International Labor Organization’s Worst Forms of Child Labor
Convention (Convention 182) in 1999.90 It prohibits the forced
recruitment of children under the age of eighteen for use in armed
conflict.91
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In general, international humanitarian law applies to both
international conflicts and non-international conflicts. However,
these organizations rely on the hierarchical structures of the state and
the military command for the implementation of the law. Thus, the
success of the implementation depends on the existence of a military
chain of command and a strong desire from within the organization
to comply with international law obligations.92 This raises the
question of who is responsible when there is breach of international
law in a failed state. Thurer, an international law scholar, argues that
although the legal capacity of the State continues to exist, it cannot be
held responsible for not having prevented offences. This is because
the State does not have the necessary power to act.93
In such a scenario, where the judiciary has collapsed,
international organizations like the United Nations or the ICC can
step in to prosecute and punish individuals committing crimes. In
recent years, this has been made possible through the establishment
of ad hoc tribunals, for instance, in Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda
(1994).94 These tribunals are the first international tribunals to hold
high-profile leaders like Rwandan Prime Minister, Yugoslav
President, and leaders of Bosnian Serbs accountable for their
crimes.95 However, ad hoc tribunals are considered to be inconsistent
in their accountability of the violations of international criminal law,
are expensive especially for poor countries, which should be utilizing
all their monetary resources on national building instead of spending
it on tribunals, and these tribunals are also believed to exacerbate
tensions rather than promote reconciliation.96
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RED CROSS (Dec. 31, 1999), https://www.icrc.org/ eng/resources/documents
/article/other/57jq6u.htm.
93
Id.
94
Ad Hoc Tribunals, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29,
2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/international-criminal-jurisdiction
/ad-hoc-tribunals/overview-ad-hoc-tribunals.htm.
95
Sophie Crockett, Are International Courts Effective?, E-INT’L REL.
STUDENTS (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.e-ir.info/2011/11/27/are-internationalcourts-effective/.
96
Id.
92

389

2018

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

6:1

1. International law and the Case of Myanmar
Myanmar has been on the Fragile State Index97 (FSI) – previously
known as the Failed State Index, from 2006 to 2011. Figure 1, in the
proceeding appendix, shows that the level of state-based conflict
deteriorated from 2007 to 2009. It began improving in 2010 but

Source: Fund for Peace98
beginning in 2015, the ratings have again begun to go up again i.e.,
the society and institutions are increasingly vulnerable to failure. The
FSI is calculated by considering various social, economic, and
political indicators.99 As a result, understanding them is crucial
because they illustrate the bigger picture of a society and political
system in a country. States that recruit child soldiers are more often

Fragile State Index (previously known as Failed State Index) is an annual
report published by Foreign Policy magazine and Fund for Peace, a think tank,
since 2005. It analyzes the vulnerability of states to conflict and collapse based on
several indicators.
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than not, categorized failed states.100 If the Burmese government
takes measures to improve its scores on these indicators, it will be
able to solve the issue of child soldiering, at least to some extent.
Failed states recruit child soldiers to use them as defense in
intra-state counter-insurgency.101 This is evident in the case of
Tatmadaw as well as the ethnic groups. As discussed above, both of
these entities have been engaged in conflicts with the ethnic groups
and need a strong, large force to maintain their control. Widespread
unemployment and poverty has pushed many children be a part of
the ethnic militia; many others are kidnapped and forced to serve in
the army.102
Moreover, failed states do not have access to the free global
economy, they fund their wars through illegal means.103 For instance,
the ethnic groups are engaged in large-scale illegal drug trade to fund
their operations and buy weaponry. The Tatmadaw on the other hand,
engages in shoddy deals with Chinese and Thai companies to earn
their revenues because international sanctions have stopped the
international businesses from investing in the country.104
The FSI highlights one of international law’s major limitation:
implementation. Ad hoc tribunals and the Joint Action Plan are
examples of how international law is dealing with the child soldiers in
Myanmar but are producing limited effects. Since international
legislations and moral arguments do not have an impact on rebel
groups and failed states,105 ad hoc tribunals can be a way of
Robert Bates defines a failed state as the “implosion of the state”,
where the state transforms “into an instrument of predation” and the state
effectively loses its monopoly on the means of force. Robert Bates, State Failure,
ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 2, (June 2008), http://www.annualreviews.org
/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.132017
101
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investigating the crimes committed by Burmese warlords and military
officials for recruiting child soldiers. Although the effectiveness of
these tribunals is highly debated, it is still better than no activity on
the part of the international community.106 The objective behind
setting-up a tribunal is crucial in a country like Myanmar where no
crime related to child soldiering or violence (in general) has been
punished. Even if a single warlord is punished or only a few military
officials are charged, it will set a precedent of how recruiting child
soldiers is unacceptable. Similarly, these cases can act as deterrence if
the international community and the citizens believe that these
criminal proceeding are fair.107
The Joint Action Plan is another attempt to deal with child
soldiers but has shown limited results. The Government of Myanmar
and the United Nations signed it in 2012 “to prevent the recruitment
and use of children by its armed forces”.108 Under the Action Plan,
the government will have to work towards the discharge of children
and their rehabilitation and reintegration into civilian life.109 As per
the implementation plan, all the under-age recruits were supposed to
be released over a period of 18 months and Country Task Force on
Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) was to ensure that there was no
more recruiting. In addition, the government and CTFMR had
planned to establish monitoring mechanisms to allow access to bases,
personnel, and documentation verification.110 Since then, 745 children
have been released by the army and the government has implemented
106
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349-368, -- (2005).
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108
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?NewsID=42333#.V_pDzeArLIU.
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http://www.wvi.org/myanmar/publication/child-protection-factsheet-childrenaffected-armed-conflict.
110
Ye Lwin Oo, Government of Myanmar and the United Nations sign landmark
Plan of Action to release children from armed forces, UNICEF (June 27, 2012),
http://www.unicef.org/myanmar/reallives_19257.html.

392

2018

Child Soldiers in Myanmar

6:1

steps to reinforce age assessment procedures within the centralized
military recruitment process.111 However, there are problems with the
identification of the recruited children, especially the ones with armed
groups which are outside the purview of the governing bodies.
Although the Tatmadaw and the armed groups have official
policies prohibiting underage recruitment, lack of safeguards, and
accountability are the loopholes through which the recruitment
continues.112 According to the report by Child Soldiers International,
children continue to be recruited unlawfully by Tatmadaw and the
armed groups. This is attributed to the failure to address
accountability, continued falsification of age documents and coercing
the children. Additionally, the legal procedures for investigation to
prosecute military officials using and abetting recruitment of child
soldiers are still unclear.113
2. International Criminal Court
The ICC declared child soldiering to be a war crime and has
taken action to prosecute the recruiters in the past. Hence, examining
its role in Myanmar’s context is crucial. The ICC is impartial and
independent in its proceedings and has international jurisdiction over
internal conflicts. However, in order to maintain state sovereignty,
the ICC can only function where the State itself is unwilling or unable
to carry out the prosecution.114 In 2014, the ICC convicted former
Congolese militia leader, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for “conscripting
and enlisting children under the age of 15 into his militia.”115 Through
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his conviction, the ICC sent a message to the international
community that such crimes would not go unpunished. Similarly, in
2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted former Liberian
president, Charles Taylor for 11 war crimes including recruiting
children under the age of 15 for combat. These two convictions are
significant steps taken by the international justice system but, it also
shows how judicial systems at the national level are failing to
prosecute those involved in such crimes.
In the case of Myanmar, will the military junta or the warlords
of the ethnic armies ever be tried in such a tribunal? Likely not. This
is because firstly, Myanmar is not a signatory to the Rome Statue.116
And, as per Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the ICC cannot prosecute
from the states that have never joined the court. The Security Council
(UNSC) would have to give the ICC jurisdiction over these cases.
Secondly, the ICC can open an investigation only when the issue is
referred to them by the State party or the UN Security Council, or if
it is authorized by the Pre-Trial chamber based on the information
provided to them by individuals or NGOs.117 Even if the Security
Council plans to do so, permanent members of the UNSC and close
allies of the military junta – China and Russia – can veto this
decision.118
China and Russia’s actions on similar UNSC resolutions
illustrates their likelihood to use their veto power. In January 2004, a
resolution on Burma was put forward by the U.S., United Kingdom,
and Northern Ireland. However, China and Russia vetoed it citing
the following reasons: it was an internal matter of a sovereign state,
situation was not a threat to international peace, and security and
other bodies of the UN like the Human Rights Council should deal
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with it.119 China and Russia would likely use the same explanation for
a veto of a UNSC resolution, referring jurisdiction of Myanmar cases
to the ICC.
The ICC is considered to be the last resort for victims who
no longer believe their national judicial system will give them
justice.120 The international community likely still hopes that the
Myanmar government and judiciary can prosecute the leaders of the
military junta and warlords at the national level. The national
legislations are required to give their domestic court jurisdiction over
crimes listed in the Rome Statute if they do not want the ICC to
interfere in their internal matters. Suu Kyi will have to work towards
making this happen.
Most importantly, child soldering has been an issue in Burma
for more than two decades.121 But the Rome Statue came into force
only in 2002.122 As a result, it can look into crimes that are committed
only after 2002. In order to prosecute the perpetrators of pre-2002
crimes, ad hoc tribunals will have to be created.123 Aung San Suu Kyi
should not forget that the major reason for her popularity and
widespread support is that the Burmese people believe she will
ensure that justice prevails in the country. Therefore, Suu Kyi will
have to take measures in that direction. This should include
submitting to the jurisdiction of international law governing bodies.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Child soldering in Myanmar should not be seen as an isolated
problem. It is an outcome of the larger socio-economic and political
problems that the country faces. Hence, the government and the
international organizations need to focus on solving the problems of
poverty, unemployment, and political instability as discussed in the
comment before child soldiering can be eliminated.
The government should begin with fostering domestic peace.
This begins first by ending the offensive against the rebel groups.
The government should adopt a middle approach that maintains the
regional autonomy of the ethnic groups and, at the same time,
ensures that the central government is able to implement policies for
the social and economic development of its citizens. Secondly, the
government must reduce the powers of the military. The military has
vested interests in the economic and political aspects of the country
and after tremendous efforts has become the powerful institution
that it is today. The military will not allow the government to
undertake any measures that are detrimental to their interests and
undermine their authority. Only after bringing the military under
government oversight, can Suu Kyi work towards discharging the
child soldiers.
Finally, for international law to be successfully applicable to
the children of the country, the Myanmar government must take
measures to bring itself under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Similarly,
the government can also request its allies, China and Russia, to
support the UNSC resolution of giving the ICC jurisdiction over
Myanmar cases. Although this may seem unlikely to happen, given
the fact that both China and Russia themselves commit human rights
violations, the new government should make an attempt to negotiate.
International courts and treaties have been created to provide justice
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to the victims of unspeakable crimes.124 It is thus, the responsibility of
the national government to ensure that its citizens get that justice.

Statement of ICC-Prosecutor at the Commencement of Trial in the case against
Messrs. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Ble Goude, ICC-CPI (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.
icc-cpi.int /Pages /item.aspx?name=otp-stat-29-01-2016.
124

397

